Islamic Relief and Islamic terrorism

Islamic Relief and Islamic terrorism

Nadir Ahmed: Taqiyya Incarnate

Nadir Ahmed: Taqiyya Incarnate

By David Wood

I’ve known for a long time that Nadir Ahmed’s debate career would be coming to an end. Thus, I’ve never really felt it necessary to stress his efforts to deceive Christians. Nadir believes that it is acceptable to lie to his debate opponents in a desperate attempt to gain an advantage over them. Moreover, even when his deceptions are pointed out, he lies to cover them up. When Nadir’s dishonesty is combined with his despicable debate etiquette, his poor debate performances, his constant insults, his complete lack of credentials, and his total lack of standing in the Muslim community, it’s no wonder that few people are willing to deal with him.

Nevertheless, Nadir will continue to have occasional speaking/debate opportunities, for four reasons. First, some have agreed in the past to set up a debate with Nadir, and they feel morally obligated to honor their agreement, despite the fact that virtually no one on the planet is interested in seeing Nadir debate. This is the situation with Ministry to Muslims, an organization which hosted Nadir’s humiliating defeat against Sam Shamoun. After the debate, the ministry decided to give Nadir a chance to redeem himself. Later, Nadir completely embarrassed himself and his religion in his debate with James White, and even Muslims turned their backs on him. The ministry knows that Muslims won’t be interested in watching any debates with Nadir; however, they feel obligated to go through with the debate because they gave their word. Second, some people have no clue who Nadir is, so they believe him when he sends them emails claiming to be a respected Muslim debater. They may, then, arrange a debate because they are ignorant of the fact that Nadir has absolutely no credibility among Muslims or Christians. Third, some organizations want to schedule debates in which the Christian debater can achieve a landslide victory against a weak opponent. I am not a fan of this tactic; I would rather see debaters of comparable skill debate the issues. Yet it is a simple fact that some people want to see the Muslim side humiliated. Thus, instead of arranging a debate with a reputable Muslim scholar, some organizations will arrange a debate with Nadir Ahmed, giving the Christian debater an easy victory. Fourth, new Christian debaters, with little or no debate experience, won’t want to jump into the ring with respected Muslim debaters such as Shabir Ally. Hence, they may want to get some debate practice by taking on weak, unknowledgeable opponents such as Nadir.

With these things in mind, I thought it might be important to share something I learned in my dealings with Nadir. Anyone who debates him must utterly refuse to exchange arguments with him, for he lacks the integrity necessary to honor such agreements. Prior to our debate, Nadir demanded that I exchange criticisms with him ahead of time. He sent me the four criticisms he would be raising against Christianity, and I sent him the four criticisms I would be raising against Islam. I then spent most of my preparation time studying for the four criticisms he had sent me. Amazingly, by the time we debated, Nadir had changed most of his criticisms! That is, the criticisms he brought against Christianity in our debate were almost completely different from the ones he had sent me. Since Nadir has repeatedly denied any guilt in this matter, I will carefully lay out the evidence.


On June 11th, 2006, Nadir said the following in an email:

All my arguments and source material will be provided to David ahead of time, so that he can be properly prepared. Thus, no material in this debate will be discussed without being submitted prior to David.

On June 12th, I told Nadir that I would rather not have him send me his arguments ahead of time, since I knew he would insist that I share my arguments as well. I’m not opposed to the idea of exchanging arguments prior to a debate, but I would only be willing to exchange arguments with someone I actually trust (i.e. not Nadir). With that in mind, I said to Nadir, “Don’t worry about sending me your arguments and source material. I’d like to see how well I respond off the cuff.”

On June 17th, Nadir rejected my attempt at avoiding the argument-exchange. He said this:

As for presenting my arguments ahead of time, I believe this is normal protocol for debates, I would insist that you take them because I want to eliminate any possibility of the speakers not knowing how to respond to a particular issue which will make it appear as if his opponent has ‘won’ and soundly refuted him. When in reality, the answer to such arguments can be very easily given if only the speaker prepared ahead of time. This takes away from the quality of the debate. Please keep in mind that these subjects are vast, and no one knows all there is to know in the issues. As for seeing how you respond off the cuff, then this is not the time for such a test, perhaps you can practice before the day of the debate.

Notice that Nadir claims he is against using arguments that are meant to catch an opponent off guard. Also note that, according to Nadir, exchanging arguments is standard practice (this is a complete lie). I still didn’t want to exchange arguments with him, but on June 30th, Nadir claimed that refusing to exchange arguments is unethical. He said:

I feel that trying to take advantage of someone’s ignorance to a particular subject does not make what you are saying true. We should find more ethical means to score points for our faiths.

Since I didn’t want Nadir accusing me of being unethical, I reluctantly agreed to exchange arguments. (Notice that Nadir says that it is unethical to use arguments meant to catch an opponent off guard.)

On July 21st, Nadir sent me his arguments. He began his email with the following:

Here are the questions which I would like to ask you in our discussion. I think it is a good idea to submit them to you ahead of time, so you can have time to think about them and prepare for us. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me.

Nadir then gave me the four arguments he would supposedly be bringing against Christianity. First, he said that he would be using passages such as, “My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?” He said that he would be doing this to show that Christianity really teaches polytheism, and that the only difference between a Trinitarian and a pagan is that the Christian claims there is only one God.

Second, he said that he would be raising issues such as man-worship and the “resurrection” of Osiris, which somehow shows that Christians stole their views from other people.

Third, he said he would be questioning me about Jesus’ infancy, and how it is possible to view Him as God.

Finally, he said that he would ask me about Melchizedek in Hebrews 7:3-5. According to Nadir, Melchizedek has the attributes of God, and this is a problem for Christianity.

I was happy with this list, since it meant that Nadir didn’t want to exchange all our arguments. Instead, he only wanted to exchange criticisms. A few days later, Nadir asked for my objections against Islam [bold mine]:

Would it be possible to send over your objections against Islam in today or tomorrow? As you know, the debate is less than 2 weeks away, and I would like to enough time to look over the material.

As for the material I sent you, that will cover all my comments or objections which I will raise against Christianity, meaning that I will mention nothing in my presentation which I have not already submitted to you prior. Therefore, that will give you adequate preparation to respond.

Later the same day, I told Nadir that my objection to Islam is that every time I’ve gone to Islam looking for evidence, I’ve come up empty-handed. I also explained that I have problems with the reliability of Muhammad, so that I don’t trust anything he says about God. Nadir responded by requesting that I limit myself to five criticisms, and that I send them to him ahead of time:

I would request David to please document the 5 objections he would like to raise in the debate and send it to me as soon as possible so I can prepare.

I have already sent David my objections, all of them related to the concept of God in Christianity. As I mentioned, I will not be raising any other issues. I ask that David will do the same. [Bold mine.]

I was even more generous than Nadir requested: I limited my objections to four (instead of five), and I sent them to him ahead of time.

Many other things were said in our exchanges, but this is enough to prove that my initial apprehension at exchanging arguments with Nadir was entirely correct. Anyone who reads our exchange and then listens to the debate will immediately notice something. While I criticized Islam using the arguments that I submitted to Nadir ahead of time, Nadir only used his second argument! What happened to the “My God, My God” passage? What happened to the issue about Jesus being a baby? What happened to Melchizedek? Nadir simply didn’t use the objections he said he would use. Indeed, he replaced these criticisms with other objections to Christianity. He attacked the New Testament for lacking scientific evidence, archaeological evidence, and prophetic evidence. He also attacked Christianity for allowing people to drink alcohol, which, he argued, causes Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in infants. All of this was, of course, completely unexpected.

This helped Nadir in two ways. First, whereas he knew my criticisms ahead of time, I didn’t know his. This meant that he was able to prepare his responses to my criticisms, while I was responding off the top of my head. Second, by sending me arguments that he never used, Nadir was able to make most of my preparation meaningless. I studied the book of Hebrews almost every day while preparing for the debate. Why? Because Nadir said that he would be asking me about a passage in Hebrews 7. But Nadir never brought up this passage in the debate. Nor did he bring up most of the arguments he sent me. Thus, much of my preparation time was wasted, for I ended up preparing for the wrong criticisms.

This was a brilliant series of deceptions on Nadir’s part (keep in mind the fact that his beliefs teach him that it’s okay to lie). He pressured a Christian into exchanging criticisms ahead of time, and he used the Christian’s reluctant trust to gain an unfair advantage. But Nadir’s deceptions didn’t stop there. He went on to deny any wrongdoing on his part!


Nadir offered four main justifications for the fact that he had changed the criticisms he had sent me.

First, he said that he was only doing what I had requested. After the debate, my friend Nabeel asked Nadir why he had changed his criticisms. Nadir responded, “Because David said that he wanted to see how he would respond off the cuff.” (Note that Nadir admitted here that he had deliberately changed his criticisms in an effort to catch me off guard.) This response just didn’t work, however. While I had initially said that I would rather respond off the cuff (because I didn’t want to exchange arguments with Nadir), I later agreed that I would exchange criticisms. As the excerpts above show, Nadir promised that he would bring up four issues, and no others. This was a lie, and his pathetic excuse only added to his deception.

Second, when I confronted Nadir about his deception, he changed his response. He said that I had claimed in my emails that the Holy Spirit would give me all of the answers I needed and that Nadir was free to change all of his criticisms. I told Nadir that he was a liar and I challenged him to produce the email where I had said this. He couldn’t produce the email, because I had never said it. (Notice again that Nadir admitted that he had deliberately changed his criticisms.) Hence, this further deception fails as well.

Third, several months later, Nadir came up with a further justification. He said that my friend Nabeel had claimed that we didn’t need to exchange arguments. Since Nabeel said that we didn’t need to exchange arguments, Nadir argued that he was free to say whatever he wanted to say. (Notice that Nadir again admitted that he had changed his criticisms.) This justification was similar to the first. When I was giving my reasons for not wanting to exchange arguments with Nadir, my friend Nabeel sent several emails to him defending my point of view. But when Nadir suggested that I was trying to score cheap points for my religion, I finally agreed to exchange criticisms. My agreement with Nadir took place after Nabeel objected to the exchange. So let’s look at the progression here. (1) Nadir says we should exchange arguments. (2) I say that I don’t want to. (3) Nadir demands that we exchange arguments. (4) Nabeel says that we don’t need to exchange arguments. (5) Nadir says that we’re trying to score cheap debate points. (6) I finally agree to exchange arguments. (7) Nadir sends me his criticisms. (8) I send Nadir my criticisms. (9) During the debate, Nadir uses different criticisms in order to score cheap debate points. (10) I confront Nadir about the way he deceptively changed his criticisms. (11) Nadir, after his other excuses fail, claims that, since Nabeel said we didn’t need to exchange arguments, he was free to change his criticisms! Nadir’s reasoning is simply amazing. There seems to be no end to his lies.

Finally, once Nadir realized that his third excuse had failed miserably, he came up with a fourth excuse (which was probably his best). He said that, since I had claimed in my opening statement that there is evidence for the reliability of the Bible, he was free to attack the Bible with whatever criticisms he wanted to bring, and he was under no obligation to stick to the criticisms he had sent me ahead of time. Now let’s think about this. Nadir knew ahead of time that I would be appealing to the reliability of the New Testament, and he sent me a list of all the criticisms he would be using. Yet he came with different criticisms, and justified the switch by claiming that I had opened the door by appealing to the reliability of the Bible!

I must say here that I partially agree with Nadir’s reasoning. If I bring up a specific argument in a debate, Nadir would be free to respond, whether or not he had sent me his objection ahead of time. But that’s not what Nadir did. Indeed, he answered practically nothing I said in my opening statement. The criticisms that he gave me ahead of time would have been far more relevant to my case. And yet he changed his criticisms anyway.

But it gets worse, for I have proof that Nadir was planning this all along. Prior to our debate, he emailed me and asked whether I agree that the Bible allows people to drink in moderation. I agreed that this is the position of the Bible. I then said, “Why are you asking me about this?” but he wouldn’t tell me. It wasn’t until the debate that I found out the purpose of his question. Nadir’s main argument against Christianity was that it ultimately leads to Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. Hence, Nadir was planning to use this criticism all along, even though he promised that he would only use the criticisms he had sent me.

Nadir’s fourth justification, then, is further deception. It also makes no sense. According to Nadir, if two parties agree to exchange criticisms, and one party claims that there’s evidence for his position, the other party is free to bring up any and all criticisms and to abandon the criticisms they had previously agreed to. But if this is the case, then it’s pointless to exchange criticisms! In a debate, both sides are going to claim that there is evidence for their positions, and so, according to Nadir, both sides will be free to change all of their criticisms! Why, then, make an agreement in the first place? Taqiyya, my friends. Taqiyya.


The point of this article is not to show that Nadir Ahmed is dishonest. No one is going to dispute that. Nor is the point to complain that Nadir tricked me, for I learned a great deal from this ordeal. When Nadir and I debated, I knew next to nothing about taqiyya (lying for Islam), but now I know that I must be very careful about trusting Muslims, many of whom will not hesitate to deceive non-Muslims (see here and here for additional examples). It was better that I learn this early on (in my first debate) than much later with a more experienced Muslim opponent. I also learned that many Muslims share Nadir’s view of deceiving non-Muslims. Several Muslims have read about what Nadir did, and all of them have so far defended Nadir. They just don’t see a problem with his actions. (For the record, if a Christian were to do what Nadir has done, Christians would be completely appalled.) But again, none of this is my reason for writing this article.

The purpose of this article is simply to stress to Christian debaters that they must be wary of trusting their Muslim opponents, especially when that opponent is Nadir Ahmed. As I said earlier, Nadir will certainly have some debate opportunities in the future, despite the fact that his career ended several months ago. When Nadir contacts his opponents, claiming that he wants to exchange arguments so that no one is caught off guard, opponents beware! Nadir has absolutely no personal integrity, and he will gladly tell a million lies to further his religion.

By David Wood

DR. AHMED AL-TAYEB: MEET THE WORLD’S ‘MOST INFLUENTIAL MUSLIM’ – And learn why the “moderate/radical” Muslim dichotomy is a farce.

DR. AHMED AL-TAYEB: MEET THE WORLD’S ‘MOST INFLUENTIAL MUSLIM’ – And learn why the “moderate/radical” Muslim dichotomy is a farce.

By Raymond Ibrahim

There’s nothing like knowing Arabic—that is, being privy to the Muslim world’s internal conversations on a daily basis—to disabuse oneself of the supposed differences between so-called “moderate” and “radical” Muslims.

Consider the case of Egypt’s Dr. Ahmed al-Tayeb.  Hardly one to be dismissed as a fanatic who is ignorant of the true tenets of Islam, Tayeb’s credentials and career are impressive: he holds a Ph. D in Islamic philosophy from the Paris-Sorbonne University; formerly served as Grand Imam of Egypt, meaning he was the supreme interpreter of Islamic law; formerly served for seven years as president of Al-Azhar University, considered the world’s leading institution of Islamic learning, and is currently its Grand Imam.   A 2013 survey named Tayeb the “most influential Muslim in the world.”

He is also regularly described by Western media and academia as a “moderate.”  Georgetown University presents him as “a strong proponent of interfaith dialogue.”  According to The National, “He is considered to be one of the most moderate and enlightened Sunni clerics in Egypt.”  In February 2015, the Wall Street Journal praised him for making “one of the most sweeping calls yet for educational reform in the Muslim world to combat the escalation of extremist violence.”

Most recently he was invited to the Vatican and warmly embraced by Pope Francis.  Al Azhar had angrily cut off all ties with the Vatican five years earlier when, in the words of U.S. News, former Pope Benedict “had demanded greater protection for Christians in Egypt after a New Year’s bombing on a Coptic Christian church in Alexandria killed 21 people.  Since then, Islamic attacks on Christians in the region have only increased.”

Pope Francis referenced his meeting with Tayeb as proof that Muslims are peaceful: “I had a long conversation with the imam, the Grand Imam of the Al-Azhar University, and I know how they think.  They [Muslims] seek peace, encounter.”

How does one reconcile Tayeb’s benevolent image in the West with his reality in Egypt?

For instance, all throughout the month of Ramadan last June, Tayeb appeared on Egyptian TV explaining all things Islamic—often in ways that do not suggest that Islam seeks “peace, encounter.”

During one episode, he reaffirmed a phrase that is almost exclusively associated with radicals: in Arabic, al-din wa’l-dawla, meaning “the religion and the polity”—a phrase that holds Islam to be both a religion and a body of rules governing society and state.

He did so in the context of discussing the efforts of Dr. Ali Abdel Raziq, a true reformer and former professor at Al Azhar who wrote a popular but controversial book in 1925, one year after the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate.  Titled, in translation, Islam and the Roots of Governance, Raziq argued against the idea of resurrecting the caliphate, saying that Islam is a personal religion that should no longer be mixed with politics or governance.

Raziq was vehemently criticized by many clerics and even fired from Al Azhar.  Concluded Tayeb, with assent:

Al Azhar’s position was to reject his position, saying he forfeited his credentials and his creed.  A great many ulema—in and out of Egypt and in Al Azhar—rejected his work and its claim, that Islam is a religion but not a polity.  Instead, they reaffirmed that Islam is both a religion and a polity [literally, al-din wa’l-dawla].

The problem with the idea that Islam must govern the whole of society should be obvious: Sharia, or Islamic law, which is what every Muslim including Tayeb refer to when they say that Islam is a polity, is fundamentally at odds with modern notions of human rights and, due to its supremacist and “anti-infidel” aspects, the source of conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims the world over.

That this is the case was made clear during another of Tayeb’s recent episodes.  On the question of apostasy in Islam—whether a Muslim has the right to abandon Islam for another or no religion—the “radical” position is well known: unrepentant apostates are to be punished with death.

Yet Tayeb made the same pronouncement.  During another Ramadan episode he said that “Contemporary apostasy presents itself in the guise of crimes, assaults, and grand treason, so we deal with it now as a crime that must be opposed and punished.”

While his main point was that those who do not follow Islam are prone to being criminals, he especially emphasized those who exhibit their apostasy as being a “great danger to Islamic society. And that’s because his apostasy is a result of his hatred for Islam and a reflection of his opposition to it. In my opinion, this is grand treason.”

Tayeb added what all Muslims know: “Those learned in Islamic law [al-fuqaha] and the imams of the four schools of jurisprudence consider apostasy a crime and agree that the apostate must either renounce his apostasy or else be killed.”  He even cited a hadith, or tradition, of Islam’s prophet Muhammad calling for the execution of Muslims who quit Islam.

Meanwhile, when speaking to Western and non-Muslim audiences, as he did during his recent European tour, Tayeb tells them what they want to hear.  Recently speaking before an international forum he asserted that “The Quran states that there is no compulsion in religion,” and that “attempts to force people into a religion are against the will of God.”  Similarly, when meeting with the Italian Senate’s Foreign Policy Commission Pier Ferdinando Casini and his accompanying delegation, Tayeb “asserted that Islam is the religion of peace, cooperation and mercy….  Islam believes in freedom of expression and human rights, and recognizes the rights of all human beings.”

While such open hypocrisy—also known as taqiyya—may go unnoticed in the West, in Egypt, human rights groups often call him out.  The Cairo Institute for Human Rights recently issued a statement accusing Al Azhar of having two faces: one directed at the West and which preaches freedom and tolerance, and one directed to Muslims and which sounds not unlike ISIS:

In March 2016 before the German parliament, Sheikh al-Tayeb made unequivocally clear that religious freedom is guaranteed by the Koran, while in Cairo he makes the exact opposite claims….  Combating terrorism and radical religious ideologies will not be accomplished by directing at the West and its international institutions religious dialogues that are open, support international peace and respect freedoms and rights, while internally promoting ideas that contribute to the dissemination of violent extremism through the media and educational curricula of Al Azhar and the mosques.

At any rate, if Tayeb holds such draconian views on apostasy from Islam—that is, when he’s speaking in Arabic to fellow Muslims—what is his position concerning the Islamic State?  Last December, Tayeb was asked why Al Azhar refuses to issue a formal statement denouncing the genocidal terrorist organization as lapsing into a state of kufr, that is, of becoming un-Islamic, or “infidel.” Tayeb responded:

Al Azhar cannot accuse any [Muslim] of being a kafir [infidel], as long as he believes in Allah and the Last Day—even if he commits every atrocity….  I cannot denounce ISIS as un-Islamic, but I can say that they cause corruption on earth.

As critics, such as Egyptian talk show host Ibrahim Eissa pointed out, however, “It’s amazing.  Al Azhar insists ISIS are Muslims and refuses to denounce them.  Yet Al Azhar never ceases to shoot out statements accusing novelists, writers, thinkers—anyone who says anything that contradicts their views—of lapsing into a state of infidelity.  But not when it comes to ISIS!”

This should not be surprising considering that many insiders accuse Al Azhar of teaching and legitimizing the atrocities that ISIS commits.  Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah Nasr, a scholar of Islamic law and Al Azhar graduate once exposed his alma mater in a televised interview:

It [Al Azhar] can’t [condemn the Islamic State as un-Islamic].  The Islamic State is a byproduct of Al Azhar’s programs.  So can Al Azhar denounce itself as un-Islamic?  Al Azhar says there must be a caliphate and that it is an obligation for the Muslim world [to establish it].  Al Azhar teaches the law of apostasy and killing the apostate.  Al Azhar is hostile towards religious minorities, and teaches things like not building churches, etc.  Al Azhar upholds the institution of jizya.  Al Azhar teaches stoning people.  So can Al Azhar denounce itself as un-Islamic?

Similarly, while discussing how the Islamic State burns some of its victims alive—most notoriously, a Jordanian pilot—Egyptian journalist Yusuf al-Husayni remarked on his satellite program that “The Islamic State is only doing what Al Azhar teaches.  He went on to quote from textbooks used in Al Azhar that permit burning people—more specifically, “infidels”—alive.

Meanwhile, Tayeb—the face of and brain behind Al Azhar—holds that Europe “must support all moderate Islamic institutions that adopt the Al-Azhar curriculum,” which “is the most eligible one for educating the youth.”  He said this during “a tour [in Germany and France] to facilitate dialogue between the East and the West.”

As for the ongoing persecution of Egypt’s most visible non-Muslim minorities, the Coptic Christians, Tayeb is renowned for turning a blind eye.  Despite the well-documented “severe persecution” Christians experience in Egypt; despite the fact that Muslim mobs attack Christians almost “every two to three days” now—recent examples include the burning of churches and Christian homes, the coldblooded murder of a Coptic man defending his grandchild from Muslim bullies, and the stripping, beating, and parading in the nude of a 70-year-old Christian woman—Tayeb recently told Coptic Christian Pope Tawadros that “Egypt represents the ultimate and highest example of national unity” between Muslims and Christians.

Although he vociferously denounces the displacement of non-Egyptian Muslims in Buddhist Myanmar, he doesn’t have a single word for the persecution and displacement of the Copts, that is, his own Egyptian countrymen.  Instead he proclaims that “the Copts have been living in Egypt for over 14 centuries in safety, and there is no need for all this artificial concern over them,” adding that “true terrorism was created by the West.”

Indeed, far from speaking up on behalf of Egypt’s Christian minorities, he has confirmed that they are “infidels”—that same label he refused to describe ISIS with.   While he did so in a technical manner—correctly saying that, as rejecters of Muhammad’s prophecy, Christians are infidels [kafir]—he also knows that labeling them as such validates all the animosity they feel and experience in Egypt, since the mortal enemy of the Muslim is the infidel.

This is consistent with the fact that Al Azhar encourages enmity for non-Muslims, specifically Coptic Christians, and even incites for their murder.  As Egyptian political commentator Dr. Khalid al-Montaser once marveled:

Is it possible at this sensitive time — when murderous terrorists rest on [Islamic] texts and understandings of takfir [accusing Muslims of apostasy], murder, slaughter, and beheading — that Al Azhar magazine is offering free of charge a book whose latter half and every page — indeed every few lines — ends with “whoever disbelieves [non-Muslims] strike off his head”?

The prestigious Islamic university—which co-hosted U.S. President Obama’s 2009 “A New Beginning” speech—has even issued a free booklet dedicated to proving that Christianity is a “failed religion.”

One can go on and on.   Tayeb once explained with assent why Islamic law permits a Muslim man to marry a Christian woman, but forbids a Muslim woman from marrying a Christian man: since women by nature are subordinate to men, it’s fine if the woman is an infidel, as her superior Muslim husband will keep her in check; but if the woman is a Muslim, it is not right that she be under the authority of an infidel.  Similarly, Western liberals may be especially distraught to learn that Tayeb once boasted, “You will never one day find a Muslim society that permits sexual freedom, homosexuality, etc., etc., as rights.  Muslim societies see these as sicknesses that need to be resisted and opposed.”

To recap, while secular Western talking heads that don’t know the first thing about Islam continue squealing about how it is being “misunderstood,” here is arguably the Muslim world’s leading authority confirming many of the cardinal points held by ISIS: he believes that Islam is not just a religion to be practiced privately but rather is a totalitarian system designed to govern the whole of society through the implementation of its human rights abusing Sharia; he supports one of the most inhumane laws, punishment of the Muslim who wishes to leave Islam; he downplays the plight of Egypt’s persecuted Christians, that is, when he’s not inciting against them by classifying them as “infidels”—the worst category in Islam’s lexicon—even as he refuses to denounce the genocidal Islamic State likewise.

Yet this well credentialed and respected scholar of Islam is considered a “moderate” by Western universities and media, from Georgetown University to the Wall Street Journal.  He is someone whom Pope Francis trusts, embraces, and quotes to reassure the West of Islam’s peacefulness.

In all fairness of course, Tayeb is neither a “moderate” nor a “radical.”  He’s merely a Muslim trying to be true to Islam.   Put differently, he’s merely a messenger.

Critics would be advised to take it up with the Message itself.


Should We Blame Islam For Terrorism?

Should We Blame Islam For Terrorism?

This is the rhetorical question — “no” being the only conceivable response — that the Iranian-born David Shariatmadari, now living in the U.K., asked in a recent article in The Guardian.

He began his exercise in taqiyya by insisting that while in the late 20th and early 21st century, some Muslims have begun to resort to “jihadi terrorism,” such a weapon had never before been used in the 1400-year history of Islam. And since nothing had changed in the message of Islam – the texts have remained the same since Islam’s beginning – what could explain this sudden appearance, in the late 20th century, of “jihadi terrorism”?

Shariatmadari locates the cause in the “political economic, military, and social changes in the Middle East.” He deplores the fact that many non-Muslims are starting to seek in the Qur’an the explanation of Muslim violence. He quotes the philosopher Roger Scruton as saying “that we need to deal with these difficult suras,” and notes condescendingly of Scruton that “it’s not an unreasonable thought if you’re unfamiliar with Islam.” For Shariatmadari says that what’s in the Qur’an “provides an easy-to-grasp account of acts that otherwise seem inexplicable. Who knows (or can be bothered to find out) what those verses [really] say, and how they can be interpreted?” Yes, Infidels will misunderstand the Qur’anic verses – they can’t “be bothered to find out” what they really mean – that is, will take them literally, and in this manner, will explain the phenomenon of “jihadi terrorism.”

However, he doesn’t feel obliged to let his readers decide for themselves what Qur’anic verses may mean. He fails to quote a single verse or sentence or phrase from the Qur’an or Hadith. Shariatmadari wants you to stay well away from those texts, insisting that “a proper explanation [for Muslim terrorism and violence] isn’t to be found here [in the Islamic texts].” In fact, the Qur’an gets in the way of a meaningful inquiry: “all it [looking into the Qur’an] really does is stand in the way of a proper investigation. It’s like a sign that says ‘look here and no further,’ obscuring sometimes a little too conveniently, far more complex causes.” So let’s have no more talk about the Qur’an.

Shariatmadari says we have to “look beyond the [Islamic] texts.” Why? Is it because the texts are beyond an Infidel’s understanding, and would only confuse him, as he implies, or is it, rather, that the texts are all too clear – and have been for 1400 years – in commanding the use of violence and terror against the Infidels?

Few will agree with Mr. Shariatmadari that looking into the Qur’an “stand[s] in the way of a meaningful inquiry” into Islam. It is, in fact, the only way to find out what Islam teaches. And when he mocks those who claim that “Islam is especially predisposed towards violence,” this makes one even more eager to take a look at those texts. So let’s round up the usual Qur’anic suspects. Here are just four of the most telling:

Qur’an (3:151) – “Soon shall We cast terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers, for that they joined companions with Allah, for which He had sent no authority

Quran (8:12) – “I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Therefore strike off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them”

Quran (9:5) – “So when the sacred months have passed away, then slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them captive and besiege them and lie in wait for them in every ambush, then if they repent and keep up prayer and pay the poor-rate, leave their way free to them.

Quran (9:29) – “Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.

There are more than one hundred other verses in the Qur’an that are all about violence and terror. Shariatmadari does not mention, not even in an attempt to explain away, by “contextualizing,” any of the 109 Jihad verses, and the violence that runs through the Qur’an and the Hadith. He keeps up his extended mockery of those who want to draw conclusions from what is in those texts: “Who knows (or can be bothered to find out) what those verses say, and how they have been interpreted?” Well, many Unbelievers have not been dissuaded from finding out “what those verses say”and “how they have been interpreted” is clear from the 1400-year behavior of Muslims. If 1.5 billion Muslims can find out “what those verses say” then so can I, and so can you, and so can any man. And we discover those commands to Believers, telling them to engage in violent Jihad against, and to terrorize the Infidels, the very verses cited by al-Awlaki and al-Baghdadi and Osama bin Laden and other leaders or members of terror groups, so scrupulous in adducing textual justification for their acts.

These verses are prescriptive, valid for all time, for Muslims everywhere. Can similar verses commanding violence and terror against an enemy, and prescriptive rather than descriptive, be found in the Jewish scriptures? In the New Testament? Robert Spencer notes the significance of this difference: “Indeed, throughout history, these texts[in the Bible] have never been taken as divine commands that either must be or may be put into practice by believers in a new age. All these passages, after all, are descriptive, not prescriptive. They nowhere command believers to imitate this behavior, or to believe under any circumstances that God wishes them to act as his instruments of judgment in any situation today.”

Do we find violence prescribed, or described, for Hindus in the Bhagavad Gita? And where does Christ speak of war and violence in the way that Muhammad does? Did we overlook something in the Sermon on the Mount? Where does Christ preach war against non-Christians? Where does the Buddha preach unending war against all non-Buddhists? Jews may lay claim to the Land of Israel, but Muslims lay claim to the entire world. There is a difference. Islam, claims Shariatmadari, “is not especially predisposed toward violence.” But no major religion’s foundational texts have anything like the violence that is to be found throughout the Qur’an and Hadith and Sira.

What about the Muslim wars of conquest? asks Shariatmadari. Yes,” they definitely happened” he admits, “but not in a way that marks Islam out from other cultures.” For “the dominant (often genocidal) military powers since the 17th century have been Christian.” Not for the first time, his Tu-Quoque is showing. Here’s the difference, and it’s a simple one: When Muslims conquered many different lands and subjugated many different peoples, they were acting according to what Allah had commanded, and following the example of Muhammad, the Model of Conduct and the Perfect Man, and the leader of many military campaigns, as recorded in the Hadith and Sira. When Christians conquered lands and subjugated non-Christian peoples (as the Spanish did, with such ferocity, in South America), they were acting not according to, but in defiance of, the teachings of Jesus. That’s what “marks Islam out from other cultures.” One might also note that the behavior of the Spanish conquistadores in South America does have something to do with Islam, for their violence reflected the effect of 770 years of the Reconquista, when the Spanish tactics and attitudes mirrored the brutality of the Muslims they were fighting.

Shariatmati mocks those who may have concluded that there is something “special” about Islam:

Since the Westminster attacks, many people seem to have been getting stuck on the following question, as they do after most acts of jihadi violence: “Is there something special about Islam? Something that lends itself to terrorism?”

There may be some people still “stuck on the question” of whether “there is something special about Islam,” but fewer with every attack by Muslim terrorists. That “something special” is to be found in the verses I’ve quoted above, and more than a hundred others in the same deadly vein. And it’s to be found, too, in the words and deeds of Muhammad, as recorded in the Hadith and Sira. People in the Western world have had their attention fixed on Muslim terrorists not, pace Shariatmadari, “ever since the Westminster attacks,” nor intermittently, “after most acts of jihadi violence,” but steadily, since 9/11/2001, when the attack by jihadi terrorists on the World Trade Center signaled the real beginning of their campaign of terror against Infidels in the West. That campaign has continued, with more than 30,000 attacks by Muslim terrorists world-wide recorded since that fatidic date. And terror has been used, along with the conventional warfare conducted in recent decades by Jihadis against the Unbelievers, in many places: in Afghanistan, against Russian soldiers; in Kashmir, against the Hindu Pandits; in the Philippines, against the Christian farmers in the Moro Islands; in both Thailand and in the Chittagong Hills of Bangladesh, against Buddhists; and in Nigeria, against the Christian Igbo.

In the West, many have come to understand what it is about Islam that has led so many Muslims either to participate in, or to give support to, or express agreement with, terrorism against Infidels. These people realized that they could not rely on what Muslims themselves said about Islam, for the practice of taqiyya – religiously-sanctioned deception to protect the faith of Islam, which originates in Shi’a Islam but has analogues in Sunni Islam – has become too frequent and too transparent. Nor could they trust the academic “experts” in Islam, given the intellectual corruption in universities (where Islamic studies are almost everywhere in the hands of apologists in the Esposito and Armstrong line). Instead, they have engaged in self-directed study, a kind of home-schooling, reading the Qur’an and significant portions of the Hadith, and Sira, to make sense of this faith that, they soon discovered, is also a political ideology. For Islam not only regulates almost every aspect of life for its adherents, but imposes a duty of conquest on them as well. Islam is based on an uncompromising division of the world between Muslims and Unbelievers, and prescribes war between the two, until the ultimate triumph of the Jihadis, when Islam will everywhere dominate, and Muslims rule, everywhere. This is something David Shariatmadari does not mention.

Many non-Muslims have not wanted to look too closely into Islam. It’s upsetting. They choose to believe that Islam is “peaceful” and “tolerant” (as Muslim apologists keep assuring them). That’s a comforting fiction, but also dangerous, as it minimizes the menace, and keeps too many in the imperiled West whistling in the dark. It is especially disturbing to see those in positions of power, who are supposed to instruct and protect us, choose rather to dismiss Islamic terrorism as “having nothing to do with Islam,” or as being carried out by “misunderstanders of Islam” (Barack Obama). Others declare that Muslim terrorists “defame” Islam (General Mattis), or insist that what those terrorists do constitutes a “perversion of the faith” (General McMaster, Theresa May). No matter how many times Muslim terrorists declare quite clearly the justification for their attacks by quoting from the Qur’an and Hadith, no matter how many learned clerics similarly justify these attacks by citing Islamic jurisconsults, many Infidels still refuse to connect Islam to Islamic terrorism, and further declare that anyone who does so is guilty of Islamophobia, an unpardonable offense in today’s topsy-turvy world.

David Shariatmadari insists that the people who connect terrorism by Muslims to what is in the Qur’an and Hadith are proving themselves “unable to deal with the complexities of a world in which politics…interacts with religion.”

Shariatmadari’s claims are absurd. Those who “connect terrorism” to the Qur’an and Hadith are not “unable to deal with the complexities of the world,” but on the contrary, they are the ones most able to squarely face the disturbing reality of what Islam teaches. It is those who deny that connection who cannot bear too much reality. Those who have taken the trouble to study the Qur’an and the Hadith (that is, a few hundred of the Hadith most relevant to Jihad and terrorism), the very people Shariatmadari repeatedly mocks, know there is indeed something “special” about Islam. They know that the Qur’an contains more than a hundred verses extolling and commanding violence, and verses telling Believers to “strike terror” in the hearts of the Infidels. They know that Muhammad was a military leader, who conducted many dozens of raids on the enemy, and that the Hadith and Sira are full of stories of his taking part in attacks, and even participating in mass decapitations of prisoners. They know, because they’ve read them, that the texts of Islam are suffused with violence.

Shariatmadari writes: “Let’s assume for a moment, then, that Islam is especially predisposed towards violence. If that’s your view, then you’ll need to show why the history of jihadi terrorism is so very short: this is emphatically a late 20th and early 21st century phenomenon, yet Islam has been around since the seventh century.”

This is the heart of Shariatmadari’s argument, and is flatly false. The history of jihad terrorism is as old as Islam itself. For the Islamic conquests were not merely a matter of armies clashing, but of terror deliberately inflicted by Muslims in order to subdue much more numerous populations. How was the conquest of North Africa, all the way across to the Iberian Peninsula, and then into France, where the Muslims were finally halted by Charles Martel at Tours, achieved? Was there no terrorizing of the conquered populations? What were the Muslim conquests of the Byzantine Empire, or of the Sasanian Empire, if not acts of sustained terror by mass killings? What was the conquest of India, if not one vast exercise in jihadi terrorism that constituted the greatest genocide in history, where rule by a tiny Muslim minority was maintained over centuries by terror, with many millions of Hindus killed in campaigns designed to keep them from any thought of revolt? Instead of today’s terrorism of suicide vests and trucks, it was, rather, that of “striking terror” into the hearts of Infidels by massacring not only enemy soldiers taken prisoner, but non-combatants, including women, children, the elderly.

Shariatmadari pays no attention to the history of Islamic conquest except to insist that while such “wars of conquest” did happen, it was “not in a way that marks Islam out from other cultures.” He is, after all, defending the faith, and lying in its defense is not just permissible, but laudable. It is true that the kind of terror we naturally think of today was not possible before the late 20th century. For the first thirteen hundred and fifty years of Islam, the deadliest weapons used by modern terrorists – the explosives, the suicide vests, the automatic weapons that could spray a nightclub or restaurant with gunfire, the planes to be commandeered or blown up, the trucks and cars to be stolen and rammed into crowds of Infidels, the pressure-cookers repurposed to explode in the middle of other crowds – simply did not exist. But jihadi terror was inflicted on civilians for 1400 years, with sword and scimitar and mangonel (a siege weapon to shoot projectiles over city or fortress walls), and, much later, with guns too. If you massacre helpless civilians, no matter how limited your means, that is not conventional warfare; that is sowing terror, as the Qur’an commands.

What Shariatmadari should have said is this: modern technology has done two things for Muslim terrorists: first, it has provided them with deadlier and more varied instruments of terror (though decapitation is still a mainstay) than were available to Muslim terrorists in the past; second, technology has now made possible the instant dissemination of news of those attacks all over the world, through the Internet, as was never possible in the past, and thereby makes such terrorism more vivid and frightening.

There is another change, not mentioned by Shariatmadari, that explains the greater use of terror by Muslims in the West, starting in the late 20th century. It’s because they can. It is only during the last few decades that Muslims have been allowed to enter and settle in that same West, among those who would then become victims of Islamic terror. The Muslims who committed the terror attacks in London, who put bombs in Underground trains, who butchered Drummer Rigby, who killed French cartoonists, Jewish shoppers, nightclubbers, and diners in Paris, and strollers on the promenade in Nice, who executed Pim Fortuyn (killed by a Leftist who said he “did it for Dutch Muslims”) and Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, who murdered Americans in San Bernardino and Orlando and Fort Hood and Boston, would in an earlier day simply not have been living in Great Britain, or France, or the Netherlands, or the U.S. The great migration of Muslims to the West — there are now tens of millions of them in Europe — and the availability of new weapons, and new ways to weaponize what were never intended as weapons (planes, trucks, buses, cars), are what explain the flourishing of Islamic terrorism in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. We in the West take note of Muslim terror now because we are its well-publicized, and latest victims, and we tend to forget that in numbers far more people, millions of them, have been killed in Asia and Africa over the centuries in campaigns of Islamic terror.

Shariatmadari claims that in the late 20th century, certain “political, economic, military and social changes in the Middle East,” caused jihad terrorism to start up. So why doesn’t he describe even one of those changes? What does he have in mind? Surely the main change in the Middle East has been this: some Muslim countries, once poor, became fabulously rich from oil and gas. And how would all these carefully unspecified changes “in the Middle East” explain the jihad terrorists who are to be found outside the Middle East, in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, even China, and in many dozens of other countries? How do changes in the Middle East explain the jihad terrorism by converts to Islam in Europe? Could it be deprivation — poverty or lack of education — that explain why Muslims support or engage in sustained campaigns of war and terror against non-Muslims? No, all the studies agree that the Muslims who engage in terrorism are both better off and better educated than the average Muslim. Africans in wretched sowetos, impoverished Hindus in Calcutta, Christians in miserable favelas in Brazil, do not become terrorists, but rich Muslims – especially Saudis and other Gulf Arabs – do. The one constant among jihad terrorists, whether in the Middle East, or Asia, or in Europe, and whether they are converts or Muslim from birth, or rich or poor, is that they have read, and have taken to heart, the Qur’an and Sunnah. For Jihad terrorism, that is both necessary, and sufficient.

Yes, there is something “special” about Islam. It comes back to Muhammad as a military leader, bent on conquest and grabbing loot. The Qur’an is a manual of war. Shariatmadari hopes you won’t bother to read either it or the war stories that are included in the Hadith. He hopes you don’t know much about the history of Islamic conquest, but will assume it involved only a series of battles between regular armies, and not the campaigns of terror as well, that were so often the Muslim norm.

The weapons of jihadi terrorism have changed over time, the technology to broadcast bulletins of terror has become immeasurably more powerful, and the peoples against whom such terror is directed have also changed, as new venues (Paris! London! New York!) have presented themselves. Violent jihad is central to the ideology of Islam, and given the immutable nature of the Qur’an, will never fall from favor, or become anything else.

Taqiyya about Taqiyya

Taqiyya about Taqiyya

Taqiyya about Taqiyya

I was recently involved in an interesting exercise—examining taqiyya about taqiyya—and believe readers might profit from the same exercise, as it exposes all the subtle apologetics made in defense of the Islamic doctrine, which permits Muslims to lie to non-Muslims, or “infidels.”

Context: Khurrum Awan, a lawyer, is suing Ezra Levant, a Canadian media personality and author, for defamation and $100,000.  Back in 2009 and on his own website, Levant had accused Awan of taqiyya in the context of Awan’s and the Canadian Islamic Congress’ earlier attempts to sue Mark Steyn.

For more on Levant’s court case, go to

On behalf of Awan, Mohammad Fadel—professor of Islamic Law at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law—provided an expert report to the court on the nature of taqiyya, the significance of which he portrayed as “a staple of right-wing Islamophobia in North America.”

In response, Levant asked me (back in 2013) to write an expert report on taqiyya, including by responding to Fadel’s findings.

I did.  And it had the desired effect.  As Levant put it in an email to me:

It was an outstanding report, very authoritative and persuasive. Of course, we don’t know what the plaintiff’s [Awan’s] private thoughts about it were, but we do know that after receiving the report, he decided to cancel calling his own expert witness [Dr. Fadel]—who happens to be a Muslim Brotherhood sympathizer. After reading your rebuttal, he decided he would rather not engage in that debate.

My expert report follows.  In it, I quote relevant portions of Fadel’s expert report (which can be read in its entirety here).  Most intriguing about the professor’s report is that it’s a perfect example of taqiyya about taqiyya.  By presenting partial truths throughout the report, Fadel appears to have even employed taqiyya’s more liberal sister, tawriya.

Accordingly, readers interested in learning more about the role of deception in Islam—and how to respond to those trying to dismiss it as an “Islamophobic fantasy”—are encouraged to read on.

Raymond Ibrahim’s Expert Report on Taqiyya

Instructions: I have been asked to assess a report concerning the doctrine of taqiyya in Islam, written by one Mohammad Fadel; and, if I disagreed with any parts of it, to explain why—objectively, neutrally, and in a non-partisan manner.  My findings follow.


The Islamic doctrine of taqiyya permits Muslims to actively deceive non-Muslims—above and beyond the context of “self-preservation,” as is commonly believed.

One of the few books exclusively devoted to the subject, At-Taqiyya fi’l-Islam (“Taqiyya in Islam”) make this unequivocally clear. Written (in Arabic) by Dr. Sami Mukaram, a former Islamic studies professor at the American University of Beirut and author of some twenty-five books on Islam, the book demonstrates the ubiquity and broad applicability of taqiyya in its opening pages:

Taqiyya is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it … We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream … Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era.[1]

The following report is written as a response to Mohammed Fadel’s report (henceforth referred to as MFR) which deals with the topic of taqiyya and its place and usage in Islamic jurisprudence.   Because MFR is written in a premises-conclusion format, the following report will follow MFR’s numbering schemata, pointing out which premises are agreeable and which are not—offering correctives to these latter resulting in an antithetical conclusion.

Numbers/Premises of MFR in Order:

1-3: Preliminary statements.

4: Agreed.

5:  Agreed, with the following caveat:  To many Muslims, jihad, that is, armed struggle against the non-Muslim, is the informal sixth pillar.   Islam’s prophet Muhammad said that “standing in the ranks of battle [jihad] is better than standing (in prayer) for sixty years,”[2] even though prayer is one of the Five Pillars, and he ranked jihad as the “second best deed” after belief in Allah as the only god and he himself, Muhammad, as his prophet, the shehada, or very First Pillar of Islam.[3]

All this indicates jihad’s importance in Islam—and thus importance to this case, since, as shall be seen, taqiyya is especially permissible in the context of jihad or struggle to empower Islam and/or Muslims over non-Muslims.

6: Agreed.  Qiyas, or analogical reasoning, the practice of finding antecedents in the teachings of the two revelatory sources (Qur’an and Hadith) and rationalizing their applicability to modern phenomena, also belongs to usul al-fiqh, or Islam’s roots of jurisprudence.  It gives more elasticity to Islam’s rules (a major theme throughout this report).  Qiyas, for example, is the way al-Qaeda and other jihadi organizations justify suicide attacks: although killing oneself is clearly forbidden in Islam, in the context of jihad—in the context of trying to empower Islam—suicide attacks are rationalized as legitimate forms of stealth warfare, since those giving their lives are not doing so out of despair but rather for Islam (as in Qur’an 9:111).[4]

7-19: Generally agreed (or indifferent to: some information in these numbers is not necessarily germane to the issue at hand and did not warrant confirmation).

20“Normative Islamic doctrine places strong emphasis on the obligation to speak the truth.”

This is the first of many statements/premises that are only partially true.

For starters, Islamic jurisprudence separates humanity into classes.  The rules concerning the relationship between a Muslim and a fellow Muslim differ from the rules concerning the relationship between a Muslim and a non-Muslim.

First there is the umma—the “Islamic nation,” that is, all Muslims of the earth, irrespective of national, racial, or linguistic barriers.  Many of the Qur’an’s and Hadith’s teachings that appear laudable and fair are in fact teachings that apply only to fellow Muslims.

For example, although the Qur’an’s calls for Muslims to give charity (zakat) appear to suggest that Muslims may give charity to all humans—in fact, normative Islamic teaching is clear that Muslim charity (zakat) can only be given to fellow Muslims, never to non-Muslims.[5]

As for legal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims—or kuffar, the “infidels” (kafir, singular)—within the Islamic world, these fall into two main categories: first, the harbi, that is, the non-Muslim who does not reside in the Islamic world; if at any time a Muslim comes across him in the Muslim world, according to classic Islamic doctrine, he is free to attack, enslave, and/or kill him (the exception is if he is musta’min—given a formal permit by an Islamic authority to be on Muslim territory, such as the case of the many foreigners working in the Arabian Peninsula).[6]

Second is the dhimmi, the non-Muslim who lives under Muslim domination (for example, all the indigenous Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Berbers, etc. whose lands were conquered by Muslims beginning in the 7th century).   By today’s standards, the rules governing the dhimmi, most of which are based on the so-called “Conditions of Omar” (sometimes the “Pact of Omar”) are openly discriminatory and include things such as commanding non-Muslims to give up their seats whenever a Muslim wants it.[7]

It is, then, in this divisive context that one must approach the Qur’an, keeping in mind that most of the verses discussing human relations are discussing intra-relations between Muslims, not Muslims and non-Muslims.  For examples of the latter, see Qur’an 9:5, 9:29, 5:17, and 5:73 for typical verses that discuss relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, verses which have further abrogated the earlier, more tolerant ones.[8]

As for the Qur’an verses listed in MFR 20—which are meant to support the statement that “Normative Islamic doctrine places strong emphasis on the obligation to speak the truth,” a close reading, supported by mainstream Islamic exegeses, demonstrates that the true function of those verses is to portray true believers (Muslims) and Islam’s prophets as the epitome of honesty and sincerity.  Significantly, none of the verses mentioned in MFR 20 actually exhort Muslims to be honest and truthful, including to fellow Muslims, in the same vein as, for example, unequivocal statements such as Do not lie to one another” (Colossians 3:9) and “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:16).

The fact is, other Islamic teachings and caveats have permitted Muslims to deceive even fellow Muslims.  For example, the doctrine of tawriya allows Muslims to lie in virtually all circumstances provided that the lie is articulated in a way that it is technically true.

The authoritative Hans Wehr Arabic-English Dictionary defines tawriya as, “hiding, concealment; dissemblance, dissimulation, hypocrisy; equivocation, ambiguity, double-entendre, allusion.” Conjugates of the trilateral root of the word, w-r-y, appear in the Quran in the context of hiding or concealing something (e.g., 5:31, 7:26).

As a doctrine, “double-entendre” best describes tawriya’s function. According to past and present Muslim scholars (several documented below), tawriya is when a speaker/writer asserts something that means one thing to the listener/reader, though the speaker/writer means something else, and his words technically support this alternate meaning.

For example, if someone declares “I don’t have a penny in my pocket,” most listeners will assume the speaker has no money on him—though he might have dollar bills, just literally no pennies.

This is legitimate according to Islamic law, or shari‘a—the body of legal rulings that defines how a Muslim should behave in all circumstances—and does not constitute “lying.”

In a fatwa, or Islamic decree, popular Sheikh Muhammad Salih al-Munajid asserts that, “Tawriya is permissible if it is necessary or serves a shari‘a interest.”  As mentioned, empowering Islam is one of the highest shari‘a interests [9] (hence why jihad, so lauded by Islam’s prophet as aforementioned, is sometimes seen as the “sixth pillar”).

After surveying the consensus of the Islamic community (ijma, a root source of Islamic jurisprudence, as MFR 6 correctly indicates) Sheikh al-Munajid concludes by saying: “Tawriya is permissible under two conditions: 1) that the words used fit the hidden meaning; 2) that it does not lead to an injustice” [“injustice” as defined by shari‘a; empowering Islam through tawriya or empowering a Muslim against an infidel is certainly not an injustice from an Islamic point of view].

Otherwise, it is permissible for a Muslim even to swear when lying through tawriya. Munajid, for example, cites a man who swears to Allah that he can only sleep under a roof (saqf); when the man is caught sleeping atop a roof, he exonerates himself by saying “by roof, I meant the open sky.” This is legitimate. “After all,” Munajid adds, “Qur’an 21:32 refers to the sky as a roof [saqf].”

By way of modern examples, and because some Muslims hold it to be a “great sin”[10] to acknowledge Christmas (since doing so validates Christianity, a different message than Islam), one Muslim cleric recently appeared on video counseling Muslims to tell Christians, “I wish you the best,” whereby the latter might “understand it to mean you’re wishing them best in terms of their [Christmas] celebration.” But—here the sheikh giggles as he explains—“by saying I wish you the best, you mean in your heart I wish you become a Muslim.”[11]

As with most Muslim practices, tawriya is traced to Islam’s prophet Muhammad. After insisting Muslims “need” tawriya because it “saves them from lying,” and thus sinning, in a video, Sheikh Uthman al-Khamis adds that Muhammad often used it.[12] Indeed, Islam’s prophet is on record saying “Allah has commanded me to equivocate among the people inasmuch as he has commanded me to establish [religious] obligations”; and “I have been sent with obfuscation”; and “whoever lives his life in dissimulation dies a martyr.”[13]

More specifically, in a hadith, Muhammad said: “If any of you ever pass gas or soil yourselves during prayers [thus breaking ablution purity, or wudu‘ [14], hold your nose and leave”[15]: Holding one’s nose and leaving implies smelling something offensive—which is true—though it implies someone other than the offender is responsible.

Following their prophet’s example, many leading Muslim figures have used tawriya, such as Imam Ahmed bin Hanbal, founder of one of Islam’s four schools of law, practiced in Saudi Arabia (the teachings of which have spread far and wide among the world’s Muslims, thanks to Saudi funding). Once when Hanbal was conducting class, someone came knocking, asking for one of his students. Hanbal answered, “He’s not here, what would he be doing here?”[16]—all the time pointing at his hand, as if to say “he’s not in my hand.” The caller, who could not see Hanbal’s hands, assumed the student was simply not there and left.

Sheikh Muhammad Hassan,[17] another very popular Egyptian cleric (who once said Islam forbids Muslims from smiling to infidels, except when to Islam’s advantage [18]) and Dr. Abdullah Shakir, [19] are also on record justifying tawriya. In recorded videos they both give the example of someone knocking on your door, you do not wish to see them, so a relative answers the door saying, “He’s not here,” and by “here” they mean the immediate room, which is true, since you will be hiding in another room.

On the popular Islam Web,[20] where Muslims submit questions and Islamic authorities respond with a fatwa, a girl poses her moral dilemma: her father has explicitly told her that, whenever the phone rings, she is to answer saying “he’s not here.” The fatwa solves her problem: she is free to lie, but when she says “he’s not here,” she must mean in her mind that he is not in the same room, or not directly in front of her.

Despite their deceptive natures, and in accordance to mainstream Islamic teaching, none of the aforementioned examples of tawriya—beginning with Islam’s prophet and followed  by Islam’s doctrinaires, past and present—are considered lies.

This is significant.

Furthermore, that tawriya, which allows Muslims to deceive fellow Muslims, is legitimate according to shari‘a, should be indicative of how much leeway there is for Muslims when speaking to non-Muslims—considering that Islam also teaches Muslims to be loyal to fellow Muslims and to have enmity for non-Muslims, as in the doctrine of wala’ wa bara’.[21]

21: Again, the statement that “The Prophet Muhammad also emphasized the importance of honesty as a central principle of Islam,” followed by the hadith “Honesty leads to righteousness…” is only valid in the context of Muslim to Muslim relations.

Again, because tawriya is techincally not lying, as Islamic consensus holds—provided the words fit the meaning used to mislead others—it is considered permissible, or mubah, though a minority categorize it as “disliked,” meaning that its performance is not a sin, though not performing it is rewarded (as MFR 17 correctly indicates).

As for the Islamic prophet himself—whose example is to be upheld as closely as possible by Sunni Muslims (sunna meaning “example”)—above and beyond the aforementioned, according to a canonical hadith, it is well known that he permitted lying in three scenarios: to reconcile quarreling parties, to one’s wife, and in war, or jihad.[22]

It is the third of these categories, jihad, that is relevant here.

According to one Arabic legal manual devoted to jihad as defined by the four schools of Sunni Islamic law, “The ulema [“scholars”] agree that deception during warfare is legitimate … deception is a form of art in war.”[23]  Moreover, according to Dr. Mukaram, the foremost expert on taqiyya, this deception is classified as taqiyya: “Taqiyya in order to dupe the enemy is permissible.”[24]

This Muslim notion that “war is deceit” goes back to the Battle of the Trench (year 627), which pitted Muhammad and his followers against several non-Muslim tribes known as Al-Ahzab. One of the members of Ahzab, Na‘im ibn Mas‘ud, went to the Muslim camp and converted to Islam. When Muhammad discovered that the Ahzab were unaware of his conversion, and thus defection, he told Mas‘ud to return and try to get the Ahzab forces to abandon the siege. It was then that Muhammad memorably declared, “For war is deceit.” Mas‘ud returned to the Ahzab without their knowing that he had switched sides and intentionally began to give his former kin and allies bad advice. He also went to great lengths to instigate quarrels between the various tribes until, thoroughly distrusting each other, they disbanded, lifting their siege.[25]

A more compelling expression of the legitimacy of deceiving non-Muslims is found in the following authentic anecdote from the Muslim prophet’s life. A poet, Ka‘b ibn Ashraf, offended Muhammad with his verse, prompting the latter to exclaim, “Who will kill this man who has hurt Allah and his prophet?” A young Muslim named Muhammad ibn Maslama volunteered on condition that in order to get close enough to Ka‘b to assassinate him, he be allowed to lie to the poet.

Muhammad agreed.[26]

Ibn Maslama traveled to Ka‘b and began to denigrate Islam and Muhammad. He carried on in this way till his disaffection became so convincing that Ka‘b took him into his confidence. Soon thereafter, Ibn Maslama appeared with another Muslim and, while Ka‘b’s guard was down, killed him.[27]

Accordingly, normative Islam teaches that deceit is integral to jihad: Ibn al-Arabi declares that “in the Hadith [sayings and actions of Muhammad], practicing deceit in war is well demonstrated. Indeed, its need is more stressed than the need for courage.” Ibn al-Munir (d. 1333) writes, “War is deceit, i.e., the most complete and perfect war waged by a holy warrior [mujahid] is a war of deception, not confrontation, due to the latter’s inherent danger, and the fact that one can attain victory through treachery without harm [to oneself].” And Ibn Hajar (d. 1448) counsels Muslims “to take great caution in war, while [publicly] lamenting and mourning in order to dupe the infidels.”[28]

In short, the earliest historical records of Islam clearly attest to the prevalence of taqiyya—deception and betrayal, as in the case of the poet Ka‘b —as a form of Islamic warfare against the non-Muslim infidel.  And this is still a legal strategy for Muslims vis-à-vis non-Muslims—especially if the lying is rationalized as a form of jihad to empower Islam or Muslims.

Furthermore, early Muslims are often depicted in early Islamic texts as lying their way out of binds—usually by denying or insulting Islam or Muhammad—often to the approval of the latter, his only criterion being that their intentions (niya) be pure.[29] During the centuries-long wars with Christians, whenever and wherever the latter were in authority, the practice of taqiyya became even more integral and widespread.

Professor Mukaram states, “Taqiyya was used as a way to fend off danger from the Muslims, especially in critical times and when their borders were exposed to wars with the Byzantines and, afterwards, to the raids of the Franks and others.”[30] The widespread use of taqiyya was one of the main reasons that prompted the Spanish Inquisition: hundreds of thousands of Muslims who had feigned conversion to Christianity secretly remained Muslim, conspiring with North African Muslim tribes to reconquer the Iberian Peninsula.[31]

22-23-24:  Partially agreed. These three sections deal primarily with the importance for a Muslim to uphold his covenant (a presumably immaterial point in the case at hand).  Covenants are in fact to be honored according to mainstream Islamic teaching.  Even so, however, and as with the general ban on lying, caveats abound:

Consider the role of covenants between Muslims and non-Muslims in the context of the perpetual nature of jihad: based on the 10-year treaty of Hudaybiya (628), ratified between Muhammad and his Quraish opponents in Mecca, mainstream Sunni jurists are agreed that ten years is the maximum amount of time Muslims can be at peace with non-Muslims; once the treaty has expired, the situation needs to be reappraised.

Based on Muhammad’s example of breaking the treaty after two years (by claiming a Quraish infraction), the primary function of the truce is to buy weakened Muslims time to regroup before renewing the offensive.[32] According to shari‘a law expert Dr. Majid Khadurri, “By their very nature, treaties must be of temporary duration, for in Muslim legal theory, the normal relations between Muslim and non-Muslim territories are not peaceful, but warlike.”[33] Hence “the fuqaha [jurists] are agreed that open-ended truces are illegitimate if Muslims have the strength to renew the war against them [non-Muslims].”[34]

Some of Sunni Islam’s four schools of law (or madhahib), such as the Hanafi, assert that Muslim leaders may abrogate treaties merely if it seems advantageous for Islam.[35] This is reminiscent of the following words of Prophet Muhammad as found in a canonical hadith: “If you ever take an oath to do something and later on you find that something else is better, then you should expiate your oath and do what is better.”[36]

Nearly 1400 years after Muhammad abrogated the covenant with the Quraish, Yasser Arafat, soon after negotiating a peace treaty criticized as conceding too much to Israel, addressed an assembly of Muslims in a mosque in Johannesburg justifying his actions by referring to Muhammad’s example: “I see this agreement as being no more than the agreement signed between our Prophet Muhammad and the Quraish in Mecca.”[37] In other words, like Muhammad, Arafat gave his word only to annul it once “something better” came along—that is, once the opportunity to renew the offensive to empower Islam came along.

In short, the idea of making covenants with non-Muslims revolves around Muslim capability. This is made clear in an authoritative Sunni legal text, Umdat as-Salik, compiled by a 14th century Egyptian scholar, Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri: “There must be some benefit [maslaha] served in making a truce other than the status quo: ‘So do not be fainthearted and call for peace when it is you who are uppermost’ [Qur’an 47:35].”[38]

25-26-27: These sections finally deal directly with the topic of taqiyya.  Again, because they are built atop some invalid premises, they are only partially correct.

Thus,  “A Muslim who is subject to severe religious persecution—which exposes him to a reasonable fear of death or severe bodily injury unless he renounce Islam—is permitted, but not required, to renounce Islam verbally even though he remains inwardly a faithful Muslim.”

This is true. However, fear of religious persecution is hardly the only criterion to justify deception in Islam, as demonstrated above.

Accordingly, the assertion from MFR 26 that “Significantly, however, he [Muslim] is only permitted to lie about his religious belief if he is subjected to severe persecution, e.g., loss of life or severe bodily pain” is plainly false.

As mentioned, according to shari‘a law, deception is permissible in several contexts above and beyond the question of self-preservation against persecution.

Furthermore, MFR mentions Qur’an al-Nahl (16:106), which discusses the permission for Muslims to dissemble their identity if persecuted by non-Muslims, as the primary verse justifying taqiyya.  In fact, Muslim jurists often point to another verse, Qur’an 3:28, which better captures the overall nature of taqiyya in a more applicable context: “Let believers [Muslims] not take infidels [non-Muslims] for friends and allies instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with God—unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions.”[39]

The exegesis of Qur’an 3:28 of Muhammad ibn Jarir at-Tabari (d. 923), author of one of the most standard and authoritative Qur’an commentaries throughout the Islamic world, follows:

If you [Muslims] are under their [non-Muslims’] authority, fearing for yourselves, behave loyally to them with your tongue while harboring inner animosity for them … [know that] Allah has forbidden believers from being friendly or on intimate terms with the infidels rather than other believers—except when infidels are above them [in authority]. Should that be the case, let them act friendly towards them while preserving their religion.[40]

Regarding Qur’an 3:28, Ibn Kathir (d. 1373), another standard authority on the Qur’an, writes, “Whoever at any time or place fears … evil [from non-Muslims] may protect himself through outward show.” As proof of this, he quotes Muhammad’s close companion Abu Darda, who said, “Let us grin in the face of some people while our hearts curse them.” Another companion, simply known as Al-Hasan, said, “Doing taqiyya is acceptable till the Day of Judgment [i.e., in perpetuity].”[41]

Other prominent scholars, such as Abu Abdullah al-Qurtubi (1214-73) and Muhyi al-Din ibn al-Arabi (1165-1240), have extended taqiyya to cover deeds. In other words, Muslims can behave like infidels and worse—for example, by bowing down and worshiping idols and crosses, offering false testimony, and even exposing the weaknesses of their fellow Muslims to the infidel enemy—anything short of actually killing a Muslim.[42][Note: Although MFR 25 correctly asserts that “there are occasions in which it is permitted, or even required, to lie,” nowhere in the report are examples offered of when it is “required” for Muslims to lie.]

28-29“In no case, as far as I know, have Muslim theologians taken the position that it is generally permissible, much less obligatory, for Muslims to lie to non-Muslims, whether in matters regarding religious belief or secular practices…”  And (#29), “…there is no doctrinal basis in authentic Islamic teachings to support the claim, made by Ezra Levant and others … that taqiyya is anything other than an exceptional doctrine justified under circumstances of extreme duress that are simply inapplicable to Muslims living in Canada and the United States.”

The many references above (with endnotes below) from the Qur’an, from the sayings and deeds of Islam’s prophet Muhammad, and from the decrees and consensus of past and present Islamic authorities, demonstrate otherwise.

As for the idea that taqiyya is “an exceptional doctrine justified under circumstances of extreme duress,” it is well to remember that the premiere authority on taqiyya, Dr. Mukaram, asserts that:

Taqiyya is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it … We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream … Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era.[43]


Deception—known under the broad term taqiyya—is permissible in Islam, above and beyond the limited issue of self-preservation.  This assertion is not “Islamophobic”; it is true.  From a legalistic point of view, and as seen especially via the concept of tawriya, as long as deceptions are technically true (“I don’t have a penny in my pocket,” only dollars), they are not even considered lies.  The prophet of Islam, Muhammad—the example that Sunni Muslims especially pattern their lives after—regularly made use of deceit. In order to assassinate a poet (Ka‘b ibn Ashraf) who offended him, Muhammad permitted a Muslim to lie to the poet.  Muhammad is further on record giving license to breaking oaths (“if something better” comes along) and openly lying (without even employing tawriya) to one’s wife and in war.  As for the latter, which assumes a perpetual nature in the guise of the jihad against the non-Muslim in order to make Islam (and Muslims) supreme (e.g., Qur’an 8:39), deception and lies are certainly permissible.

[1] Sami Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l-Islam (London: Mu’assisat at-Turath ad-Druzi, 2004), p. 7, author’s translation.
[2] John Calvert, Islamism: A Documentary and Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008),  p. 197.
[4] See Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pgs. 141-144 where al-Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri tries to rationalize suicide attacks through qiyas and in the context of deceit.
[5] Shaykh Faraz Rabbani, “Zakat Cannot Be Given To Non-Muslims,” Sunni Path, Question ID 1527:
[6] Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 162-163.
[7] Mark Durie, The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude, and Freedom (Australia: Deror Books, 2010), pgs. 40, 141-146.
[8] David Bukay, “Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2007, pgs. 3-11:
[9] Sheikh Muhammad al-Munajid, “When Is Tawriya Legitimate,” Islam Q&A, Fatwa no. 27261:
[10] “Saying Merry Christmas is worst [sic.] than fornication or killing someone,” Islamic scholar.  YouTube:
[11] “Don’t say Merry Christmas, say I wish you the best, meaning I hope you come to Islam,” Islamic scholar. YouTube video:
[12] Sheikh al-Khamis, “The Ruling on Tawriya and Lying.”  YouTube:
[13] Sami Mukaram, Al Taqiyya Fi Al Islam (London: Mu’assisat al-Turath al-Druzi, 2004), p. 30.
[14] “Does little amount of gas (a bubble) break wudu,” Qibla, Question ID:7260:
[15] Sunan Abu Dawud (one of the six canonical hadith collections), 681:
[16] “What to do in the following situations,” Islam Door:
[17] “What is the difference between lying and obfuscating?” YouTube:
[18] Raymond Ibrahim, “Sharia’s Sinister Smiles,”
[19] “Fatwa concerning lies and their circumstances.”  YouTube:
[21] See “Loyalty and Enmity” in Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pgs 63-115.
[22] Imam Muslim, “Kitab al-Birr wa’s-Salat, Bab Tahrim al-Kidhb wa Bayan al-Mubih Minhu,” Sahih Muslim, rev. ed., Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, trans. (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2000).
[23] Ahmad Mahmud Karima, Al-Jihad fi’l Islam: Dirasa Fiqhiya Muqarina (Cairo: Al-Azhar, 2003), p. 304, author’s translation.
[24] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l-Islam, p. 32.
[25] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l-Islam, pp. 32-3.
[26] Sahih Bukhari, Hadith no. 4271:
[27] Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 367-8.
[28] Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pp. 142-3.
[29]  Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l-Islam, pp. 11-2.
[30] Ibid., pp. 41-2.
[31] Devin Stewart, “Islam in Spain after the Reconquista,” Emory University, p. 2, accessed Nov. 27, 2009.
[32] Denis MacEoin, “Tactical Hudna and Islamist Intolerance,” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2008, pp. 39-48.
[33] Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 220.
[34] Ahmad Mahmud Karima, Al-Jihad fi’l Islam: Dirasa Fiqhiya Muqarina, p. 461, author’s translation.
[35] Ibid., p. 469.
[36] Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume 9, Book 89, Number 260:
[37] Daniel Pipes, “Lessons from the Prophet Muhammad’s Diplomacy,” Middle East Quarterly, Sept. 1999, pp. 65-72.
[38] Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law (Beltsville: Amana Publications, 1994), p. 605.
[39] See also Quran 2:173, 2:185, 4:29, 16:106, 22:78, 40:28, verses cited by Muslim jurisprudents as legitimating taqiyya.
[40] Abu Ja’far Muhammad at-Tabari, Jami’ al-Bayan ‘an ta’wil ayi’l-Qur’an al-Ma’ruf: Tafsir at-Tabari(Beirut: Dar Ihya’ at-Turath al-Arabi, 2001), vol. 3, p. 267, author’s translation.
[41] ‘Imad ad-Din Isma’il Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur’an al-Karim (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiya, 2001), vol. 1, p. 350, author’s translation.
[42] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l-Islam, pp. 30-7.
[43] Sami Mukaram, Al Taqiyya Fi Al Islam (London: Mu’assisat al-Turath al-Druzi, 2004), p. 7
Keith Ellison’s Disinformation Campaign

Keith Ellison’s Disinformation Campaign

Confronted by his own words and facing a direct threat to his bid to become the next Democratic National Committee (DNC) chairman, U.S. Rep. Keith Ellison flagrantly lied Thursday. We are releasing the full audio and transcript to prove this.


Originally posted 2016-12-21 11:05:09. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

BREXIT – what does leaving the EU say about England’s demographics

BREXIT – what does leaving the EU say about England’s demographics

EU referendum results and maps: Full breakdown and find out how your area voted

The dust has not settled yet and we have already lost the UK Prime Minister with the leader of the Labour party Jeremy Corbyn likely to follow in coming weeks.  The results have rightly been described as historical and seismic.

The Telegraph reports that Boris Johnson as a glorious opportunity for the UK and it is certainly this.  Yet 48% wanted to remain in the UK.  England 53% to LEAVE and  47% to REMAIN with a turnout of 73%.  In England only London voted to remain.  What this shows

is that there is now a clear divide between Greater London and the rest of England.   For me this illustrates the elephant in the room – London’s demographics and how its changing nature has put it at odds with the rest of England.

English metaphorical idiom for an obvious truth that is going unaddressed. The idiomatic expression also applies to an obvious problem or risk no one wants to discuss.

With only 45% of Londoners  self identifying themselves as white British and the impact this has on how London votes has to be explored yet I doubt anyone will want to visit this elephant in the room. Yet if we look at the Brexit results how England voted must have a relationship to its demographics.

During the London mayoral campaign Charles Moore discussing Sadiq Khan’s and the demographics of his support base.  I have maintained before that Khan was elected Mayor of London because of the Muslim vote. Moore discusses this in his article: Sadiq Khan does the sums over Muslim votes and this should lead us to ask the question why London is at odds with the rest of England?  59.9% for REMAIN and 40.1% for LEAVE.  Will anyone dare to explore the correlation between London’s demographics and the way it voted?  I doubt it.

Originally posted 2016-06-24 14:23:03. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Taqiyya, Trust & Debating Shariah

Taqiyya, Trust & Debating Shariah


According to Islamic law, one of the areas in which lying is permitted, and sometimes required, is where it will be advantageous in dealings with attempts to gain the submission of non-believers.

The Paradoxes Of Debating Shariah

When we find ourselves with disagreements on major issues, the Western democratic approach suggests solving those disagreements by debating them.

The Koran makes it difficult for non-Muslims to have a sincere debate of this kind with shariah-compliant Muslims by providing them with theologically grounded permissions to lie. In some cases, there is actually a duty to lie if issues important to Islam are in play.

Koranic passages as well as hadiths attributed to Mohammed provide many of these exceptions, including deceiving other Muslims. One of the areas in which lying is permitted, and sometimes required, is where it will be advantageous in dealings with attempts to gain the submission of non-believers.

This practice is called taqiyya.

A Formulation Of The Rule Governing Lying

In the Reliance of the Traveler, one of the definitive texts for understanding Islamic law, the author gives a formula he attributes to Islamic philosopher and jurist Abu Hamid Ghazali:

“When it is possible to achieve [a valid] aim by lying but not by telling the truth, it is permissible to lie if attaining the goal is permissible (N: i.e., when the purpose of lying is to circumvent someone who is prevent one from doing something permissible) and obligatory to lie if the goal is obligatory.”

In simpler terms, if your goal is to spread Islam and you must lie to achieve that goal.

For those who believe bringing of the world under the rule of Islam to be a chief religious duty, deception in that cause is obligatory whenever it is necessary.

Where’s The Proof?

Both the Koran itself and important hadiths justify this understanding of deception.

“Let not the believers take the disbelievers as friends instead of the believers, and whoever does that, will never be helped by Allah in any way, unless you indeed fear a danger from them. And Allah warns you against Himself, and to Allah is the final return.” (Q 3:28)

“‘Unless you indeed fear a danger from them’ meaning, except those believers who in some 51 areas or times fear for their safety from the disbelievers. In this case, such believers are allowed to show friendship to the disbelievers outwardly, but never inwardly.…‘We smile in the face of some people although our hearts curse them.’” (Tafsir Ibn Kathir, vol. 2, 141, commenting on the above passage from the Koran.)

“Mohammed said, ‘War is deceit.’” (Bukhari vol. 4:267 and 269)

“He who makes peace between the people by inventing good information or saying good things, is not a liar.” (Bukhari vol. 3:857 p.533)

Do Western Islamic Organizations Practice Taqiyya?

In one of the documents entered as evidence by the Federal government in the 2008 Holy Land terrorism financing trial, a co-conspirator had this to say about the operations of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR):

“I believe that our problem is that we stopped working underground. We will recognize the source of any message which comes out of us. I mean, if a message is publicized, we will know…, the media person among us will recognize that you send two messages; one to the Americans and one to the Muslims.”

In addition to identifying Americans and Muslims as necessarily separate categories, this indicates the importance of sending a message ‘to the Americans’ that is different from the one that Muslims will know to be the truth.

Since it is more acceptable to lie to non-believers, the message intended ‘for the Americans’ will be the deception.

Debating Shariah

For the shariah-adherent Muslim, there can be no debate about shariah. Shariah is the direct and permanent word of God governing human relations now and forever. There is nothing to debate.

Moreover, any debate that sought to create any alteration in the terms of shariah would be an affront to God. Any human alteration of the terms of shariah following such a debate would be the creation of “man-made” law, which is forbidden by shariah. Thus, a shariah-adherent Muslim who agrees to participate in such a debate is engaged in a paradox: they are agreeing to debate what cannot be debated.

This is resolved only by taqiyya, which creates a paradox for the non-Muslim.

They want to debate the merits of shariah openly, and may receive the impression they are doing so by the participation of the shariah-adherent Muslim. Yet the ground for such a debate does not exist. Their debate partner is obligated to lie to them whenever it is necessary.

They may also simply leave you with a misleading impression, as the Reliance says: “Scholars say that there is no harm in giving a misleading impression if required by an interest countenanced by Sacred Law.”

The greatest possible interest is the spread of Islam.

Are Muslims Otherwise Required To Be Honest?

As the Reliance indicated, deception is permissible any time the goal is permissible. But this is not the only guidance the author gives.

Citing Mohammed as his source, he writes,

“I did not hear him permit untruth in anything people say, except for three things: war, settling disagreements, and a man talking with his wife or she with him (in smoothing over differences).”

War can include jihad, or efforts to bring the non-Muslim world under the rule of Islam. Even among Muslims, though, settling disputes is a permissible reason to say things that are not true. Just maintaining social harmony can justify deception under Islamic law, or just maintaining peace with your spouse.

These permissions make perfect sense given the real root of shariah in an ancient desert community in which dissention among the group could lead to a fracturing of the tribe that would expose one to death from enemies or the elements.

Nevertheless, the requirement to be honest is heavily conditioned in Islamic law. Almost any reason in which it might be effective to lie is considered justified by these terms. The only real prohibition is that you may not lie in the pursuit of forbidden things, such as alcohol or sexual misconduct.

What About Oaths Of Office, Or Testimony Under Oath?

Oathbreaking is conditionally permitted as well. According to the authoritative Sahih Al-Bukhari: “The Prophet said, ‘If I take an oath and later find something else better than that, then I do what is better and expiate my oath.’”

In the case where the ‘something else better’ is an obligatory end, such as the spreading of Islam, breaking the oath is obligatory if it is necessary to the attainment of the end.

Thus, the concerns about taqiyya must extend beyond public debates about the nature or role of shariah law. Oaths of office, such as those sworn by military officers or government officials, are religiously violable if taken by a shariah-adherent Muslim.

So too is sworn testimony, whether before a court or a legislature. Whereas the Hollywood image of swearing on a holy book before a court is meant to imply divine punishment if one should lie, in this case the divinely given obligation may point to the deception instead.

Originally posted 2016-12-14 15:23:36. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

THE GREAT HIJAB COVER-UP – the false hate crimes against Muslims in the USA

THE GREAT HIJAB COVER-UP – the false hate crimes against Muslims in the USA

Forget fake news; the real issue is fake “hate.”

Has there been one (1) documented hate crime committed by white people against any hue in the Rainbow Coalition since Nov. 8? That’s out of the 9,456,723 hate crimes alleged by America’s leading hate group, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC).

The SPLC is to “hate” what Rolling Stone is to rape. It is the biggest peddler of fantasies since Walt Disney.

I’ve read through dozens of SPLC “hate crimes” and they are all lies. The Muslim girls in particular seem to be very spirited liars.


Originally posted 2017-01-07 14:04:01. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

The campaign against Prevent is based on myths and distortion – and it’s helping Islamic extremists thrive

The campaign against Prevent is based on myths and distortion – and it’s helping Islamic extremists thrive

By Rupert Sutton

The corrosive damage done to the fabric of society by extremist narratives from across the political spectrum has at its heart one key message: that the UK’s diverse communities cannot, and should not, peacefully co-exist alongside one another.

This is emphasised in Dame Louise Casey’s report into integration, published this week.

Arguing that extremist groups “maintain significant support”, Casey’s report notes “the widespread promulgation of racist, discriminatory and intolerant material, which is judged to foment social tensions and encourage isolationism”.

Challenging such narratives is vital if the UK is to become a more integrated society, and Casey’s review identifies the Prevent strand of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy as the key plank of this process.

The 'Broken Britain' tsar' Louise Casey at the department of Department of Communities
Dame Louise Casey says elements of the anti-Prevent lobby “appear to have an agenda to turn British Muslims against Britain” CREDIT: GEOFF PUGH


Originally posted 2017-01-04 16:29:39. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

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